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Formal and informal nationalism

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

Abstract

This article argues that nationalism is an essentially dual phenomenon with its crucial loci in the formal organization of the state on the one hand, and in civil society on the other. *Formal nationalism* is connected with the demands of the modern nation-state, including bureaucratic organization and meritocratic ideology, cultural uniformity and political consensus among the inhabitants. *Informal nationalism* is identified in collective events, such as ritual celebrations and international sports competitions, taking place in civil society. Both these aspects of nationalism have been discussed in the recent literature, but it has not been common to distinguish between them. It is argued here that the two nationalisms are not reducible to each other; both are equally 'authentic', but they can be contradictory. Although the discussion is intended to have general relevance for theories of nationalism, it draws its empirical material from nationalist ideologies in two recently invented, poly-ethnic nations, the twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius.

Superficially, because of the multitude of races, Trinidad may seem complex, but to anyone who knows it, it is a simple colonial philistine society (V.S. Naipaul 1958).

Ene sel lepep – ene sel nasyon (*One single people – one single nation*; slogan from Mauritian election campaign).¹

Community draws a boundary – Decree draws a sword (James Grigsby 1990).

Introduction

Whereas the advent of nationalism has convincingly been connected with the growth of the modern state by recent theorists (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Giddens 1985; Kapferer 1988), it can also be argued that certain aspects of nationalism, which are necessary for its mobilizing potential, originate elsewhere. In this article, which discusses different aspects of nationalism in two poly-ethnic island-states – Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius – I shall argue that nationalism

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is essentially a dual phenomenon with its crucial loci in the formal state organization and in the informal civil society.

Since a successful state nationalism depends on its being acknowledged in civil society, it must try to appeal to values and sentiments initially alien to the state. Although Gellner (1983), Giddens (1985) and Hobsbawm (1990) are almost certainly right in holding that modern nationalist ideologies have been tailored to fit the demands of bureaucratic state organization and a certain, technocratic notion of 'rational' social organization, Anderson (1983), Smith (1986) and Kapferer (1988) are equally correct, and relevant, in stressing the emotional, quasi-religious aspects of nationalism. In the present analysis, I shall argue that the two nationalisms described in the literature, while they are not conventionally distinguished one from the other analytically, really are distinctive and serve different purposes, although they can also function in a complementary way.

The imagined communities of Trinidad and Mauritius

Nowhere is Anderson's (1983) oft-quoted concept of the nation as an imagined community more evidently confirmed than in the colonially created states. Commonly invoked as examples of this are the recent African nation-states (see, for example, Smith 1983), whose boundaries were randomly drawn a century ago, and whose nationalisms are of very recent origin. Even more striking are the culturally constructed nationalisms of societies *which were never pre-colonial*. Nationalists in these societies, particularly if they are poly-ethnic, cannot possibly draw upon shared imagery representing presumed ancient collectivities and transform it into images of the contemporary nation in embryonic form that standard works on nationalism would presuppose. Mauritius as well as Trinidad and Tobago are extreme instances of such emergent nations. The very societies were created through the mass importation of slaves and indentured labour during the modern era, and they have, at the time of writing, been independent from Britain for less than thirty years, Trinidad and Tobago achieving independence in 1962, Mauritius in 1968.

In both societies, the largest categories of people are of African and Indian descent; in Mauritius, Indians are more numerous and dominate politics, whereas blacks dominate politics in Trinidad and blacks and Indians there are roughly equal in number. Until the 1960s the wider social identities of the inhabitants of these islands were by and large colonial; the people knew that they were British subjects and that they were under British rule. They even knew that in an important sense, they were *created* by Britain; their history and cultural identities were contingent on British imperial policies. Neither

has a surviving aboriginal population; Mauritius, indeed, never had one. Not until the postwar years did anybody consider political independence as a possible scenario. Their histories are marked by highly visible and widely acknowledged discontinuities. For these reasons their nationalisms must be directed towards the future, not towards the past. The state nationalisms of Trinidad and Tobago and of Mauritius are poorly institutionalized in civil society; they began after World War II in both countries. Finally, in both societies there are strong ethnic ideologies that are sometimes in overt conflict with nationalism (Eriksen 1991a).

Problems in becoming a real country

The extremely *modern* nature of the Trinidadian and Mauritian societies should be recognized. Their lack of a pre-modern history or a standard body of cultural tradition, together with the widespread collective definitions of self as ethnically plural societies, make the task of depicting the nation as a primordial entity impossible. The idea that the nation is a human invention, currently under intense investigation by European and North American scholars in various academic disciplines, is a trivial fact to virtually all the citizens of these societies. They know that their nationhood must be defined, created and recreated by themselves. Mauritian and Trinidadian nationhoods belong, in domestic discourse, to the sphere of *opinion*, not to that of *doxa* (Bourdieu's terms 1980): that is, the form and content of nationalism and nationality are debatable issues and are indeed being fiercely debated in the two societies, both of which are parliamentary democracies (see Eriksen 1992).

It follows from this that one serious type of problem in forging a national identity in societies such as Trinidad and Mauritius, has to do with *authenticity*. Since the societies lack an independent pre-colonial history, the Trinidadian and Mauritian national symbolisms struggle to seem credible. Their societies, which were initially founded by agents external to, and in some respects opposed to, collective projects of independent nationhood, convey a sense of unrealness to their own inhabitants. The sense of belonging to an inferior blue-copy of a metropolitan society is strong, as is evident in the high emigration numbers of both societies; it has also been gloomily depicted by writers such as the Trinidadian V.S. Naipaul, who has written of (or, more accurately perhaps, written *off*) West Indians as 'mimic men' (Naipaul 1966) playing parts in Hollywood B-movies, and of Mauritian society as 'an overcrowded barracoon' (Naipaul 1973). The miniature Eiffel Tower at Curepipe and the miniature Notre-Dame in Port-Louis (Mauritius) are as efficient as the strangely pseudo-Gothic Stollmeyer Castle

of Port of Spain (Trinidad) in reminding the citizens of these 'absurd nations' (cf. Naipaul 1962) that there can be no primordial allegiance to their natal islands. Nationalist ideologues in these societies cannot draw on hazy collective memories of a rich semi-mythical past; their nationalism has to be directed towards the future, not towards the past.²

The challenge posed to these societies, viewed as emergent nations, is a complex one. A widely credible Trinidadian or Mauritian nationalism must cope with the persistent presence of potentially deeply dividing ethnic self-consciousnesses, and it must simultaneously create an autonomous, non-colonial ideology of credible authentic nationhood. It must try to infuse its citizens with patriotic sentiment relating to a nation that did not even exist a generation ago.

Like any ideology, a nationalism must, if it is to be successful, simultaneously serve the interests of the powerful and satisfy the perceived needs of the powerless. There may develop schisms, or contradictions, between the two poles of nationalism suggested through this duality; notably, the meaning-structures represented by official and popular nationalisms, respectively, may be different in origin and character. I shall now present and discuss the duality of nationalism in some detail with reference to aspects of nationalism in Trinidad and in Mauritius, eventually concluding that there are two distinctive nationalisms in each of these societies (or, as I shall argue, in any modern society); the one chiefly represented in the state; the other chiefly represented in civil society.

Independence Day versus Divali

Like every nation-state in the world, Trinidad and Tobago as well as Mauritius have instituted annual public holidays celebrating the emergence of the nation. The celebrations, monitored by the state, are similar in the two countries, and both would, for that matter, satisfy any set of criteria for 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm 1983).³ Trinidad's Independence Day (31 August) comprises a military parade, performances of music at public venues (steelbands and brass), and public parties, many of them hosted by government agencies for their employees. Mauritius's Independence Day, Republic Day as from 1992 (12 March), is similar in form. There are large-scale public events at sports stadiums and processions of uniformed musicians at the Champ de Mars, a huge venue in Port-Louis formerly used for military parades; and there are brewery-sponsored parties in addition to the state-sponsored ones. The universality of the language of nationalism is striking in these contexts: the striped ribbons, the banners in the colours of the national flag, and the flowers and other decorations in

the national colours displayed in conspicuous places seem to be universal common denominators of such an abstract nationalism as is being demonstrated. Trinidad and Mauritius are similar in this respect, and they are typical. Their formal state nationalisms appear as empty symbolic vessels ready to be invested with virtually any meaning whatsoever,⁴ provided they are compatible with citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state. Such a national symbolism need not be violent in character (cf. Kapferer 1988), but it connotes uniformed social unity. Port of Spain in Trinidad and Port-Louis in Mauritius, solemn and well-groomed as they appear during independence celebrations, are dead cities on these occasions. Attendance at the official events is poor; the parties staged in the evenings are 'simply parties' with no patriotic connotations for the participants. Independence Day is *just another holiday*; it is as though Mauritians and Trinidadians have taken the official nationalist symbolism at its face value, refusing to elaborate on the given symbolism, since they regard it as a set of empty rituals to which they attach little personal importance. Nevertheless, by looking at other public celebrations in the two societies it is possible to get a different impression of the potential importance of national identity and the possible content of its message in these societies. As a Trinidadian of non-Indian descent told me: 'Divali⁵ means much more to me as a national feast than Independence Day'.

In both Trinidad and Mauritius there are religious and communal feast days that initially represented only particular ethnic segments of the population, but which have come to assume national importance. There are also those which have not. During the 1980s it was decided in Trinidad and Mauritius that Emancipation Day, which celebrates the abolition of slavery, should be supplemented by a public holiday celebrating the arrival of the first Indian indentured workers; in Mauritius, cunning nationalist ideologues even decided to combine the two celebrations on one and the same day. Neither of the feasts, although lavishly sponsored by the state, occupies an important place in the minds of most citizens; few bother to attend the various public events although the mass media invariably present them as highly important ones. On these days most people clean their cars, take their families to the beach, visit relatives or *buss a lime*⁶ with their friends. In both Trinidad and Mauritius, however, most people, regardless of ethnic membership, take part in the New Year celebrations. Since this is a holiday not obviously representing any particular group, this ought not to be surprising. In Trinidad, moreover, Carnival is increasingly being celebrated by members of all ethnic categories, although it is still by and large associated with what is known locally as urban creole culture, and is rejected by Hindu neo-fundamentalists (see Vertovec 1990). However, there are also apparently in both societies purely religious festivals that have in recent years attracted the attention of

people irrespective of their personal religion. The Hindu feast Divali is a major event for the whole community in both Trinidad and Mauritius. The annual Muslim celebration of Hosay is popular among Indians and blacks alike in Trinidad but Eid-ul-Fitr is not. The annual Tamil feast Cavadee is immensely popular in Mauritius; it is an important national symbol, despite the fact that less than 6 per cent of the Mauritian population is Tamil. As one non-Tamil Mauritian explained: 'We Mauritians walk on fire, drink fire and eat fire' referring, respectively, to firewalking during Cavadee, rum and chilies.

The success of particular communal celebrations in cutting across ethnic (and class) boundaries must necessarily imply that they appeal to sentiments and aspirations which are not specific to one ethnic category of people. If we consider Divali, Hosay, Carnival and Cavadee as examples of poly-ethnically successful festivals, then, it is clear that what they all have in common is a dominant sensuous or aesthetic dimension which is less perceptible in other festivals. Hosay, Carnival and Cavadee are all markedly *physical* events, actively involving bodily experiences on the part of the participants. Divali, characterized in both societies (as in India itself) by the omnipresence of lights and light decorations, in and around private homes and in public places, presents an image of the authentic unity of civil society in so far as participation is near-universal; its connotations of peace and tolerance are also evident and are frequently mentioned by Mauritians as well as by Trinidadians.

In these and similar contexts, the societies cannot be said to be 'multicultural': what is communicated through such communal rites as Hosay (Trinidad), Cavadee (Mauritius) and Divali (both) are forms of national *identity* and not ethnic *difference*, although the ethnic origins of the celebrations are evident. In comparison, the identity presented by the formal institutions of the state does not fit with the experiences of the people to whom it is directed: the ideology does not, in these respects, communicate with the experienced needs and aspirations of part of the population, and its symbolism is therefore not credible and is ultimately impotent. One should not, of course, neglect the fact that there are important popular feasts in both societies that are restricted to particular ethnic categories (such as the Maha Shivaratree and the Père Laval in Mauritius, or Eid-ul-Fitr in Trinidad); the point is that the meaning conveyed by any kind of ritual is not necessarily specifically ethnic in character and connotations. The variable participation in large-scale rituals can in this way indicate the relativity of ethnic boundaries, and the relative lack of interest in the state-monitored nationalist arrangements indicates that there are contradictions other than ethnic ones that have a bearing on nationalism. One significant dilemma in nation-building and the creation of a national identity in Mauritius and Trinidad is evident here.⁷ This

dilemma can be described as a tension between the formal nationalism of the state and the informal nationalism of civil society.

Formal and informal aspects of national politics

... [T]he Trinidadian creole world, for example, [was] characterised by the ironic contradiction between a national capacity to laugh, play 'picong'⁸ and produce insulting calypsoes and, on the other side, groups of people who took refuge in pomposity and verbosity as a safeguard against ridicule (Lewis 1968, p. 83).

The Arms of Trinidad and Tobago are blazoned 'Arms: Per chevron enhanced sable and gules, a chevrenel enhanced argent, between a chief two humming birds, respectant or in base three ships of the period of Christopher Columbus also or, and sails set proper. The crest, upon a wreath argent and gules in front of a palm tree proper a ship's wheel or, supporters upon a compartment representing two islands arising from the sea on the dexter side a scarlet ibis and on the sinister side a cocrico, both proper and with wings elevated and addorsed. Motto: 'Together we aspire; together we achieve'.

The constitutive year of popular Trinidadian nationalism was 1956, when the respected Trinidadian historian Dr Eric Williams decided to 'put down his bucket right here' (Johnson 1986) and commit himself to Trinidadian nation-building; it was the year when he spoke about the evils of colonialism to enthusiastic crowds gathered at Woodford Square in central Port of Spain, and it was the year in which the People's National Movement [PNM] won the general election on a nationalist, pro-independence platform. It was also the year when the now legendary calypsonian, 'Mighty Sparrow', broke through and won the Calypso crown for the first time with the song 'Jean and Dinah'. This event was at least as important for Trinidadian nationalism as Dr Williams's election victory. In 1956, then, the two poles of Trinidadian national symbolism were consolidated by these two events.

Williams embodied the highest formal aspirations of Trinidadian blacks; he was already an internationally respected academic,⁹ he had a seemingly natural ability to speak in *big words*; he was determined to gain independence for Trinidad and Tobago, and additionally, he displayed a great deal of wit and other qualities typical of the 'good debater' (Abrahams 1983). In the characteristic Trinidadian way, Williams was popularly baptised the 'Third brightest man in the world'.¹⁰ 'Mighty Sparrow', on the other hand, represented the darker, violent, anarchical *jamette* (outlaw) side of the black urban community. 'Jean and Dinah' conveyed the bitterness felt by Trinidadians *vis-à-*

vis the American military personnel who, with their money and appearance of a glamorous lifestyle, had attracted many local girls for over a decade. The song may clearly be said to express a cynical attitude towards women, though it also demonstrates a determination on the part of Trinidadian men to be independent of wider systemic constraints. Nevertheless, this form of independence applies to a different type of social relationship from the ideology of independence developed by Williams. The recurring punchline of 'Jean and Dinah' goes, 'Yankee gone/Sparrow take over now', and refers to the unfaithful black women who, shamefaced, have now returned; and this time, Sparrow warns, they will have to accept the terms set by the black men.

From the outset there are clearly discernible formal and informal aspects of Trinidadian nationalism.

With regard to the ideologies of Rastafarianism and *négritude*, both important in the forging of a national identity in Trinidad, it is sometimes said that *négritude* was an intellectualist movement intending to capture the primeval spirit of Africa, led by poets more familiar with the cafés of Montmartre than with the quotidian tribal life in Senegal, whereas Rastafarianism is often described as an unrealistic 'Back to Africa' ideology and a crudely racist one. Such points are not necessarily relevant to this discussion. What should be emphasized is the ability of certain ideologies to create a sense of community that can be transformed into effective political action. In this regard, the *négritude*-inspired and simultaneously slightly proletarian ideology developed by Eric Williams was extremely efficient in forging an unambiguously black national identity in the Trinidad of the late 1950s and 1960s. If we now compare this with the recent political history of Mauritius, the difference in ideological emphases seems important.

In the years preceding Trinidad's independence there was, by and large, consensus over the desirability of some form of independence (Ryan 1972). In Mauritius, on the other hand, the political climate was tense and antagonistic throughout the 1960s; the main political opposition wished to remain colonial. First Minister [later Prime Minister] Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and his Hindu dominated *Parti Travaille* [Labour Party], which enjoyed a close working relationship with the Colonial Office, were in favour of independence and a multi-party democracy. The 'coloured' [mulatto] attorney, Gaëtan Duval, and his white/'coloured'/black *Parti Mauricien* were emphatically against independence; indeed, Duval once claimed during his campaign that if Mauritius were to become independent, then black and Franco-Mauritian women would have to wear saris. In 1967, the year of the crucial election, Duval changed his tactics, now rallying under the slogan '*Hindoo, mon frère*' ('Hindu, my brother'). The Muslim party, *Comité d'Action Musulman* [CAM] was also opposed to independence.

In the event, 44 per cent of the Mauritian electorate voted against independence.

The phenomenon of Gaëtan Duval, active in politics from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, is important for an understanding of Mauritian nationhood; he can also shed light on the similarities and differences between Trinidad and Mauritius. First, it should be made clear that Duval's role in Mauritian public discourse resembles that of a calypsonian, as was recognized by Naipaul (1973). Much of Duval's appeal lay in his evident mastery of the improvisational, informal contexts; he always marketed himself as 'King Creole'; in his heyday, he appealed to Mauritian sentiments just as 'Mighty Sparrow' appealed to Trinidadian sentiments. When campaigning, Duval would give lavish parties for his supporters; he was known as a connoisseur of food and women; a cosmopolitan who was fond of travel and whose friends included royalty and film actors – in other words, Duval epitomizes the potlatch ethos of Mauritian Creole society, metonymic of civil society as opposed to the discipline and prudence embodied in the official ideology of the then colonial state.

There is a major difference in the impact of the two 'calypsonians'. While Sparrow (like Williams, incidentally) could rely on a public sphere dominated by blacks and cultural messages identified with blacks, Duval had to contend with a society where the most numerous voting groups were of Indian descent; and who did not, moreover, identify with the values and virtues that he represented. He has thus repeatedly been stigmatized as a *communalist* [ethnic particularist] by his critics, whereas agents conveying virtually identical messages in Trinidad have been hailed as nation-builders. *Liming*, the art of doing nothing (Eriksen 1990b), is in Trinidadian civil society seen as a national attribute; the similar, slightly hedonistic lifestyle overcommunicated by Duval is seen in Mauritius as a symptom of the decadence of the blacks. Conversely, Indo-Trinidadians involved in the revitalization of Indianness are accused of being anti-nationalists and are forced into a defensive position, whereas Indo-Mauritians involved in similar movements are not criticized for being anti-national.

International sports as informal nationalism

Early in 1986 a Mauritian schoolboy wrote, in an award-winning essay: '[The nation-state of] Mauritius was born in 1968, but the miracle which is Mauritianism was born between August 24 and September 4, 1985'. These were the opening and closing dates of the second 'Games of the Islands of the Indian Ocean' (*Les Jeux des Îles de l'Océan Indien*) – the first international sports festival that Mauritius had hosted. The Games, as depicted in the schoolboy's essay, led to

the formation of a spontaneous, largely unanticipated collective Mauritian identity transcending ethnic boundaries. Unlike earlier attempts at creating such an identity, the collective focus on international sports events seemed to have no socially disintegrating repercussions or side-effects. For example, the general strike of 1970, aligning members of all communities against the state, eventually led to the imprisonment of the strike leaders (who belonged to several ethnic categories), and had no lasting effect on popular perceptions of nationhood and ethnicity. This is not to say that class consciousness and class struggle may not replace ethnicity situationally or even historically, but since it is never compatible with the dominant nationalist ideology, a successful class ideology must implement radical changes in the state administration and is therefore a project that cannot be encompassed by a dominant nationalism. Competitive sports events, on the contrary, appeal to sentiments that may be comparable to the violent nationalist symbolism described by Kapferer (1988), although they are not linked with the state; this is a national symbolism quite different from the 'formal', bureaucratic nationalist ethos which is characteristic of the modern nation-state, but which does not necessarily contradict it.

In this respect, as in many others, Trinidad is more strongly integrated in wider webs of communication and exchange than Mauritius. For decades, cricket Test matches have thus epitomized the supra-national collective identity of the West Indies to Trinidadians (as well as to Jamaicans, Barbadians and 'small-islanders'). As already noted by the Trinidadian sociologist, Lloyd Braithwaite, in the early 1950s, cricket – which is universally popular in Trinidad – can serve as 'a means of breaking down racial separation' (Braithwaite 1975, p. 61, but cf. Yelvington 1990). During my fieldwork, the qualifying games for the World Cup in Italy (1990), where eventually the Trinidad and Tobago football team was narrowly defeated by the United States, provided a focus for nationalist sentiment comparable in strength to that of *Les Jeux des Îles de l'Océan Indien*. The entire Trinidadian side was of African descent; yet it was unanimously supported, and eagerly followed, by virtually the entire population. Relevantly, sports can also have strong ethnic connotations in both Trinidad and Mauritius. Sports clubs have often been ethnic in character; in Mauritius, they still are to a great extent. This indicates that the wider, nationalist identity offered by national sports teams operates in the same spheres of relevance as important aspects of ethnic identities, and that this informal, highly emotionally-charged form of nationalist symbolism may therefore replace ethnic symbolism in the fields in question. This form of nationalism is different from the nationalism presented in formal contexts, which is far removed from the constitution of individual identity in everyday life, and which therefore does little to mitigate the potentially disintegrating effects of ethnicity. Sports

nationalism is in these respects similar to Divali or Hosay. Contrary to the national symbols and practices associated with the state, such as the flag, the national anthem and the national mottoes, sports competitions, *liming*, Divali and other informally constituted cultural institutions have firm roots in the immediate experiences of people, and can therefore more easily contribute to the production of shared meanings. Independence Day is perceived by most Trinidadians as 'just another holiday', while *jouvert*, the opening ceremony of Carnival, is an event to which hundreds of thousands of people look forward with great expectation every year, and which is certainly more effective in creating national consciousness than the state's concerted events.

In Mauritius the relevant dichotomies are comparable to the Trinidadian ones, although emphases differ. Notably, the development of a shared Mauritian national identity is in many respects intrinsically linked with the formal contexts of the changing labour market (Virah-sawmy 1985; Eriksen 1988, pp. 205–13) and the development of the tourist industry, both of which are evidently compatible with the nationalism of the state. The cultural contradictions indicated in the duality of nationalism are pervasive in a more fundamental sense than is implied by the dichotomies of respectability and reputation or formality versus informality. Indeed, the duality is an irreducible aspect of a great number of social situations and is constitutive of the social person and of any successful nationalism. This I shall argue by presenting further examples from the two societies, beginning with Trinidad, suggesting the interrelationship between the two nationalisms.

Reputation and respectability in Trinidad

In Trinidadian as well as Mauritian society, it is common to contrast values relating to what Wilson (1978) has called *respectability* (the formal) with values of *reputation* (the informal); discipline and obedience are contrasted with individual idiosyncrasy; the careerism (informal hierarchy depending on formal equality) in the labour market is contrasted with the egalitarian practices of the rumshop (informal equality negating formal hierarchy); frugality and cautious planning are contrasted with hedonistic joy, and so on. To urban Trinidadians and Mauritians, their shared national culture, whether they endorse it or not, may appear as a set of happy-go-lucky attitudes, for better or for worse. Simultaneously, Trinidad (and latterly, Mauritius) is a highly competitive capitalist society where individual prosperity and social climbing are highly valued, and where individuals are ranked according to segmentary systems of evaluation. The contradiction between the two value-systems creates practical dilemmas for the many

individuals who lead their lives between the poles (see Table 1 below), but the dilemmas – which seem unresolvable intellectually – are not necessarily seen as inherently destructive; people tend rather to shrug and identify them as natural. Like most of the people studied by social scientists, the majority of Trinidadians and Mauritians are not moral philosophers and do not necessarily require internal consistency between their diverse ‘models for action’. For instance, among many of the inhabitants of these societies, there is no practical contradiction between religious piety and a multitude of sexual partners.

The interaction between Apollonian and Dionysian values is a leitmotiv in urban Trinidadian culture, sometimes codified as class conflict, sometimes not. An illustration of the tension can be provided by looking at the patterns of expenditure in relation to Trinidad’s annual Carnival. It is expensive to take part in the carnival bands; one has to pay the choreographer and buy one’s costume; yet, there are poor Trinidadians who spend several months’ wages on this brief, annual event. During the months leading up to Carnival they save in an impeccable Apollonian manner, only to spend everything at once on one intense Dionysian orgy, with no apparent worry as to how next month’s rent will be paid. Members of the middle class also spend a lot of money on Carnival, but rarely at the expense of losing control of their personal finances. This is possibly due to the fact that such people tend to be better off, but it is widely *interpreted* as an indication that the middle class are superior to the working class where planning is concerned, but inferior to them in knowing how to enjoy themselves. Some aspects of the tension between the two systems of morality, which can be seen as complementary, are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Some variables in the codification of morality

Respectability	Reputation
Scarcity of time	Time not subjected to scarcity
Discipline	Chaos
Obedience	Freedom
Hierarchy	Equality
Contract	Trust
Large-scale society	Personal networks
Articulated purposes	No explicit purpose
Regularity	Unpredictability
Responsibility	Irresponsibility
Cumulation	Immediacy
Delayed returns	Immediate returns
Plan	Spontaneity
Seriousness	Humour
Writing	Speech
Planning carnival	Carnival
Job, family	Liming

The contradiction between the value systems, and particularly the fact that it is easier to ‘sell’ reputation (informal) than respectability (formal) values, emerges as a problem in virtually every context related to nation-building and national planning. Two events involving Eric Williams, the first prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, may serve to illustrate that this contradiction is very much alive in individuals of middle-class as well as working-class membership and ideological inclination.

When Dr Williams, at the time already an internationally known historian, began his political career in the mid-fifties, he did so by giving a series of lectures at Woodford Square, the ‘Speaker’s Corner’ of Port of Spain; a small park in front of the Parliament buildings which has been an important venue for public discourse and private discussions for more than a century. The topics of Williams’s lectures might be the political philosophy of Locke or Plato, or, for that matter, the writings of Carlyle. The purpose was to contribute to the political education and self-understanding of the ordinary citizen; most of the lectures were spun around themes of imperialism, slavery and exploitation. They were immensely popular, and Williams – a small, chain-smoking man in a grey suit, with a low voice, hearing aid and a pedantic style (or lack of it) – was cheered as though he were a calypsonian, by people overwhelmingly belonging to the urban proletariat of Port of Spain. In his lectures, he directed his attention to the desire of Trinidadians to be respectable – to be on a par with the rest of the world culturally and intellectually. In this way, he also attacked the morality of reputation: he promoted, at least at the level of rhetoric, serious political organization and intellectual ambition. The morality of reputation contains a strong element of *ressentiment* (in Nietzsche’s sense); it defines itself in contrast to, and through a rejection of, the colonial morality of duty. Through his lectures at the ‘University of Woodford Square’, Williams encouraged his listeners to make a productive and positive force of their *ressentiment* by making respectability its servant, converting it to an ‘authentically Trinidadian’ system of values, and exploiting it for their own ends.¹¹

As long as he remained in Trinidad, Williams (who died in 1981) would frequently criticize his electorate, that is, the generalized black Trinidadian, for lacking seriousness and discipline. When taking part in conferences in Europe, however, he would sometimes invite his European colleagues to come to Trinidad ‘to learn how to enjoy the good life’. In other words, Dr Williams was himself caught between the two contradictory systems of morality.

The flamboyant, elegant, unworried man-of-words or man-of-style is a much cherished prototypical character to Trinidadians of all classes. Its roots can partly be located in the strategies of resistance during slavery (Lewis 1983, pp. 180–82; Serbin 1987, pp. 114 *et seq.*)

which expresses on the one hand a rejection of hierarchy and formal organization, overt through the *ressentiment* directed against the English and later against all kinds of *bosses*, and on the other an affirmative national identity.¹² Nevertheless, like every modern nation-state, the Trinidadian state demands obedience to values of respectability (the formal). Thus, a recent, authorized national motto is: 'Discipline, Production and Tolerance', and a common complaint is that 'it is difficult to get anything done around here, because nobody cares to make long-term plans'. On the other hand, norms relating to respectability can be encountered at the very centre of the domains of *liming* – literally and metaphorically: virtually every rumshop in Trinidad features easily visible wall-placards admonishing customers not to swear while patronizing the establishment ('*No obscene language*'); furthermore, homosexuality is regarded almost universally throughout the island, and also in Mauritius, as an abominable perversion, and Trinidad's weekly press, the 'calypso of the printed word', explicitly condemns strip shows and pornography (though the same papers are full of pictures of girls in bikinis). The *steelbands*, who represented the rough reputation ethic of the *badjohns* in the urban slums, played European classical music (Bach, Beethoven, Tchaikovsky) from the very beginning (Fermor 1984, pp. 164–66), thereby indicating that they earnestly wanted to be taken seriously by the colonial establishment and its formal value system.

The carnival, the calypso and the steelband are key symbols in the official national culture of Trinidad.¹³ These are all institutions symbolically linked with the informal contexts of the urban working class of Port of Spain. An acquaintance of mine, a journalist who was of impeccable middle-class origin himself, once remarked that 'the Trinidadian middle class has not been able to create anything of lasting value, and it therefore has to be parasitic on the culture of the working class'. Whatever the case may be, it is doubtless correct to say that all these institutions are associated with slightly mythological conceptions about the loose and free, informal life of the proletariat, contrasting this image with the phlegmatic and boring Protestant virtues of the European-influenced, rule-bound, law-abiding, formal middle-class lifestyle.

In Trinidadian society, it is most important to be able to bet on both horses simultaneously, as it were, regardless of one's cultural class membership. When the highly respected Trinidadian historian, Marxist and pan-Africanist C.L.R. James died in London in 1989, the 'Mighty Sparrow' could therefore remark, in a comment on the telephone from Bonn: 'Me and James, together we cover the whole range of Trinidadian culture'.¹⁴

One cannot be recognized publicly as a *true-true Trini* unless one masters the informal aspects of public life, even if one happens to be

the prime minister. Cultural values which can be codified as *irresponsibility* and *spontaneous joy*, initially countercultural values of *ressentiment*, have become indexical for *der Volksgeist* in the public spaces of modern Trinidad. This entails that some of the key symbols of the 'lower classes', and their related values, create a normative pressure *vis-à-vis* members of the 'upper classes', where the contradictions between the moral systems are most evident. As I have argued elsewhere (Eriksen 1990b), the normative pressure between the moral systems is mutual, but proletarian (informal) values remain remarkably strong in daily practices and discourse in the contemporary Trinidadian class society. The morality of reputation, which is linked to the working class and the lumpenproletariat in Trinidadian representations, not only indicates the performing art of doing nothing (*liming*) it also represents the Calypso, the Carnival and the Steelband that are key symbols in the self-image of the working class, as well as in official Trinidad. This paradoxical situation, where 'low culture' seems to have taken the former place of 'high culture' in the ongoing production of national symbolism, is clearly a legacy of colonialism. It should also serve as a reminder that facile assumptions about cultural hegemony and the presumed dominance of bourgeois values in capitalist society may deserve closer scrutiny. In the Trinidadian case, the nationalist ethos of civil society is by no means a hostage of state ideology or values relating to capitalism.

The Mauritian language issue and the two nationalisms

The tension between the formal and the informal is strong in comparable ways in Mauritius, but the emphasis differs. Since the social significance of multiculturalism and ethnicity is generally higher in Mauritius than it is in Trinidad, it makes sense that such distinctions should be heavily glossed by ethnic ideology. Briefly, the informal tends to be associated with blacks, and the formal with Indians in Mauritius. The nature of Mauritian nationalism is, like the Trinidadian one, dual, although the anti-colonial *ressentiment* characteristic of black Trinidad has no Mauritian counterpart. On the one hand, nationhood is symbolically linked with virtues associated with competing in the world market, eradicating illiteracy and unemployment, promoting tolerance and a non-corrupt, efficient bureaucracy. On the other hand, the self-consciousness of Mauritian nationhood is perhaps encountered at its most intense in public bars where blacks and Indians drink together, while overcommunicating to each other and to the spectators (who are not necessarily foreign anthropologists) that this is actually what they are doing. While the locally widespread idea that ethnic conflicts are created by politicians is patently wrong, to claim so

indicates the presence of an acknowledged schism between the formal and the informal; between *structure* and *anti-structure* (Turner's 1974 concepts), if one prefers. The values associated with French and Kreol respectively bring out a similar cultural duality or contradiction that is immediately comparable with the West Indian dichotomies of respectability and reputation (see Wilson 1978; Eriksen 1990b). A suggestion made by the Mauritian politician Sylvio Michel (personal communication) that one ought to found a national *séga* ballet,¹⁵ neatly brings out the difference between the two nationalisms in the Mauritian context. Whereas a ballet is sufficiently far removed from the everyday experiences of Mauritians to be unproblematic in a trans-ethnic national symbolic system, the *séga* is a musical genre too closely intertwined with ethnic oppositions on the one hand – it is associated with black culture – and too sensuous and 'indecent' on the other, to form part of a formal nationalism.¹⁶

Apart from sports, the most telling Mauritian example of the distinction between the two nationalisms is probably the language issue (see Eriksen 1990a for a more detailed discussion). There are three potential national languages among the fifteen languages officially in use in Mauritius: Kreol, French and English. Although Stein's (1983) findings, based on extensive formal interviews, indicate that '*le mauricien moyen*' knows 3.78 languages (Stein 1983, p. 362), it is highly debatable whether this is practically relevant in contexts of written or oral communication. Apart from the three languages mentioned, only Bhojpuri and Hakka are spoken by significant minorities of Mauritians. Neither can claim to be of national relevance.

Among the three potential national languages, English metonymically represents knowledge and business; French represents high culture, while Kreol represents equalitarianism and 'the voice of the common man and woman'. Since it must definitely be located to the informal pole in social life, Kreol has often been neglected in writings on Mauritius. One writer thus claims that 'Mauritians tend to speak French and write English' (Mannick 1979); as a matter of fact, they tend to speak Kreol and write French, whereas English is the language of administration and higher education – the supreme example of a language entirely confined to the formal aspects of nationalist ideology. Although in theory everybody understands French (and even English) in Mauritius, it is tacitly known that their knowledge of French is highly variable: primary schoolteachers tend to speak Kreol to their pupils, and Christian and Marxist missionaries speak Kreol to their audiences.

'Kreol is bad French. When you already know Kreol, why not take the effort to learn French? Kreol works fine orally, but it won't do in writing.' These kinds of statement are very common, even among people who do not feel at ease with any other language. In a polemic

against radical nationalists who rejected French on the ground that it was the language of the colonizers, the editor of the leading daily newspaper *Le Mauricien* asked rhetorically: 'Should one refuse Fidel Castro the right to speak the language of the coloniser of his country?' (Selvon 1984).

These briefly listed examples illustrate that the main issue concerning the possibility of a national language has been the relationship between Kreol and French. There has hardly been any controversy over the choice of English as the official national language, although very few Mauritians master it. This indicates that most Mauritians perceive the Mauritian nation as being dual in character in a manner comparable to the duality of Trinidadian nationhood: It is perceived as proper and correct that English should be used in bureaucratic, formal state nationalism, while the language of civil society – the informal contexts of nationalism – could be either French or Kreol, French perhaps presenting itself as being half-way between Kreol and English on the formal-informal continuum; it is a literary, international language with high formal prestige, and yet it is understood and spoken by most Mauritians (although many speak it badly). Thus, when the need arises for a mediation between the formal and informal nationalisms, the problem usually presents itself literally as one of translation. An interesting fact is that whereas two-thirds of the Mauritian population were favourable towards an officialization of Kreol in 1976, according to a survey (SOFRES 1977), the decision of the newly elected *Mouvement Militant Mauricien* [MMM] government in 1982 to make Kreol the official language – the language of formal nationalism – was met with universal disapproval, even by people who were fluent in no other language than Kreol and the government was forced to retract in a matter of days. The Trinidadian language situation is very different, although comparable as regards the formal-informal dimension. Since the populist nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s, 'Queen's English' no longer has a clearly hegemonic position. Being proud to be a Trinidadian can nowadays imply being proud to speak Trinidadian colloquial English, which used to be universally perceived as a substandard linguistic variant.

The movement favourable to Kreol as a nationalist movement is structurally comparable to the Black Power movement in Trinidad, where it took the shape of massive demonstrations against the allegedly neo-colonial government in 1970–71. The nationalism embodied in movements endorsing black consciousness and Kreol draws its legitimacy from the immediate experiences of the citizens; it is a form of populism sceptical of the formal hierarchies of the state and its agencies. Black Power and the *Ledikasyon pu travayer* [LPT]¹⁷ are thus emphatically informal in their presentation of self. Yet, throughout the 1980s they enjoyed only limited popular support. Through their

voting, at the very least, Mauritians have shown their sympathy with the values and strategies represented by agencies of formal nationalism. In Trinidad, contemporary organizations associated with Black Power have very limited popular appeal, notwithstanding their programmatic populism and support of informal meaning-structures.

The complementarity of opposed notions

From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that the distinction between formal and informal nationalism cannot meaningfully be reduced to a distinction between 'inauthentic' and 'authentic' symbolisms. What I have called formal nationalism is therefore no less authentic than informal nationalism, nor is it necessarily less efficient in mobilizing and integrating diverse individuals ideologically. It must, however, attach itself to effective rules of transformation in order that its abstract symbolism – the flag, to mention but one example – is made relevant in the informal structuring of daily experiences. The ideological rhetoric surrounding Mauritian industrialization is a good example of this. While formal aspects of industrialization as nationalism include the improvement of the national trade balance and the cultural homogenization of the population, it presents itself to Mauritians as a means to improve their material standard of living, and to many Mauritian women as a way of achieving personal independence. Only when the two nationalisms interlock in such a way can a state nationalism be truly efficient.¹⁸ Additionally, the potency of any ideological symbolism depends on its being ambiguous or 'multivocal'. The increasing clustering of possible meanings in relation to concepts of nationhood is evident in both Trinidad and Mauritius, and by this token their nationalisms are of increasing importance. A recently coined nationalist term like 'Trinbagonian', for instance, can be interpreted and judged in different ways: its actual meaning is open to discussion. To an Indo-Trinidadian, it may connote black dominance; to urban blacks, it may indicate an unacceptable decentralization of the nation (Tobagonians are, as every Trinidadian knows, a bunch of country bumpkins. . .).

The moralities of reputation and respectability are aspects of a shared, dynamic system of values encompassing both formal and informal aspects, and some of the tensions between the complementary logics, as experienced by Trinidadians, have been depicted in Table 1. In Table 2 below, the kind of moral duality indicated is extended to a description of the interrelationship between formal and informal nationalisms.

Table 2. Aspects of two nationalisms

Formal nationalism	Informal nationalism
State	Civil society
Rules	Improvisation
Formal	Informal
Abstract	Concrete
Writing	Speech
Metaphoric kinship	Kinship
Mass media	Face-to-face interaction
Formal equality negating informal hierarchy	Informal equality negating formal hierarchy

If we were to adopt a Parsonian 'theory-of-social-action' (Parsons 1968) perspective in the analysis of the formal and the informal aspects of social organization and life-worlds, we might perhaps claim that all Trinidadians and Mauritians in any given situation *have to choose* between the implied moralities and modes of orientation. It ought to be stressed again therefore that these 'situations of choice' always take place in practical, not discursive contexts; in other words, the contradictions may not be as important to the actors as it seems. Notwithstanding this, the dichotomies enumerated in Tables 1 and 2 *do* express contradictions that are recognized by Trinidadians (and by Mauritians), and they could perhaps be labelled *cultural premises for the evaluation of situations*. The sets of value are contradictory at a logical or discursive level, but in practice they are *de facto* complementary, because nobody lives within just one of them. Respectability and reputation cannot strictly be regarded as poles on an analog scale either, since the rules are of an either/or type. However, it would be possible theoretically to locate total, individual *patterns of action* over a period, on such a scale. Individual and class-specific variations are considerable, but everybody has to relate situationally to both sets of values. It is in this sense that it is possible to claim that all urban Trinidadians or Mauritians, respectively, 'belong to the same culture', culture being an ambiguous property of a series of social processes and relationships, not a static property of society.

Conclusion

In the preceding argument, I have focused on a series of apparently contradictory notions and practices between the ideologies that I call the two nationalisms of Trinidad and Mauritius, which I have linked

to the relation between the formal and the informal aspects of national identity. I have tried not to depict this kind of opposition as an absolute conflict – as a fundamental kind of cultural contradiction illustrating the impersonal power of the state confronting the personal power of civil society – or as a frontstage-backstage relationship, where the formal identities appear as being less authentic than the informal ones, for both these assumptions are too simplistic and tend to romanticize proletarian or village life. When, for example, Peter Wilson writes about reputation ‘as being the *true nature* of Caribbean society’ (Wilson 1978, p. 230, emphasis added), he neglects the very real popularity of formal powerholders like Queen Victoria in the past¹⁹ and Eric Williams or Seewosagur Ramgoolam in the present. The universal value placed on education and, in the case of Mauritius, the preference for French *vis-à-vis* Kreol as a literary language, also indicate that the ideals of formality are no less ‘authentic’ than those of informality. Rather than connecting these notions to conceptual dichotomies of authenticity: inauthenticity; frontstage: backstage; or, for that matter, black: Indian; or middle class: working class, it can be concluded from the material discussed in this analysis that they may relevantly be regarded as complementary aspects of every person’s identity and status inventory. By the same token, the nationalisms of the two societies must be dual in a similar fashion. In my view, this insight, while not entirely original, could serve to supplement the analytic toolbox currently available in the comparative study of nationalism. Both formal and informal nationalisms are currently dealt with analytically, but no distinction is usually made between them. Allow me therefore, by way of conclusion, to mention a few perspectives that seem particularly fruitful at the present time.

(i) Nationalisms that are directed against the state have hitherto been largely identified as irredentisms, diaspora nationalisms, ethnic movements or secessionisms. One could, however, also profitably investigate the general relationship between state nationalism and civil society nationalism, searching for divergences, convergences and contradictions. If a regime becomes illegitimate, then the citizens will seek to replace it with one that in their view more accurately represents the national will. Criticism against politicians and against the state, various forms of popular uprisings and concerted protests could be investigated in their nationalist aspects; namely, as expressions of the wish to fuse the cultural and the political units. Popular Norwegian opposition against membership of the European Community [EC], which most politicians favour, is an obvious example, where a large part of the population accuses the state of betraying the nation.

(ii) Nationalisms that develop relatively independently of the nation-state, or as reactions against the nation-state, could be examined comparatively along similar lines. The informal aspects of presu-

ably every nationalism have hitherto received little attention except in the case of certain Islamic societies (see, for example, Amin 1990). The historical aspects of the development of nationalisms are perhaps particularly important here, since there are important processes of feedback taking place through time between the two nationalisms. The relationship is by no means as simple and unambiguous as is sometimes indicated in general theory on nationalism. In Germany, unlike in France, nationalism existed as an ideology before the German nation-state; in Finland, the formal and informal nationalisms have been tightly interwoven due to the historical homogeneity of the Finnish nation, whereas most African states, which are compelled to make up their nationalisms as they go along, must simultaneously find compromises, innovations or functioning forms of coercion in their attempts to come to terms with the evolving informal nationalisms, which are often numerous and which may challenge the interests of the state. In pre-1989 Central-Eastern Europe, to mention a final example of the tension between formal and informal nationalism, the majority of the population felt alienated from the state’s nationalism, which they perceived as anti-patriotic (despite its being codified, frequently, through international sports).

(iii) From this, it follows that the rise of informal nationalisms to power, namely, the transformation of informal to formal nationalism, would also be a highly interesting topic for research. Would the fun and the nationally integrative aspects vanish from Carnival if a famous bandleader became prime minister and allowed the state administration to take over its entire organization? To what extent can the leaders of the post-communist and newly independent states in Eastern and Central Europe, many of them formerly representing society against the state, retain their legitimacy now that they represent the state itself – and how has Nelson Mandela been perceived in Soweto after going into negotiations with de Klerk? Under what circumstances can a former state nationalist ideology resurface as an informal, underground, anti-state nationalism after a change in the political system?

(iv) Finally, state strategies designed to accommodate or quench informal nationalism might provide a fertile ground for comparative research that could reveal the extent to which any political regime is legitimate, and that could also shed light on the general relationship between the ideologies embedded in state and civil society in the contemporary world. Carnivals and similar collective events could be mentioned as archetypical examples of informal nationalism, where patriotism and criticism of the state are simultaneously expressed. In this regard, it is surely not without interest that the Trinidad Carnival was for decades suppressed by the colonial government. That it no longer is indicates the greater legitimacy the current regime enjoys. On the other hand, this might reduce the attraction value of Carnival.

To my knowledge, the fun has not gone out of it yet, but this could easily happen if the institution were to become too strongly identified with the Trinidadian nation-state.

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Notes

1. See Eriksen (1988, pp. 166–68) for a discussion of the several possible meanings of the word *nasyon* in the Mauritian vernacular, Kreol.
2. Several writers on nationalism, among them Anderson (1983, p. 16). Smith (1986, p. 13) and Kapferer (1988, particularly ch. 2), suggest, somewhat surprisingly, that an objectively shared past that can be readily invoked in nationalist symbolism is a necessary condition for a nationalism to be viable. If this were the case, then nationalism would have been plainly impossible in Trinidad and Mauritius.
3. See Kapferer (1988, p. 209–10) for a sympathetic critique of Hobsbawm's distinction between traditions that have been invented and those that have, ostensibly, not been invented: 'Ultimately, I cannot conceive of a tradition or mode of cultural action that is not invented' (p. 210).
4. The Mauritian flag is an example of this emptiness in official nationalist symbolism. Its four horizontal stripes (red, blue, yellow and green) officially represent the people, the ocean, the sun and the land. An unofficial interpretation encountered on several occasions claims that the red represents the *Parti Travailleiste* (the Hindus); the blue the *Parti Mauricien* (the Catholics); the yellow the Chinese, and the green the Muslims.
5. Divali is the annual Hindu 'Festival of Lights' devoted to the goddess Lakshmi.
6. *Liming* is the Trinidadian term for 'hanging out'; the art of doing nothing. See Eriksen (1990b).
7. The more readily visible contradiction between ethnicity and nationalism in these emphatically poly-ethnic societies, has been dealt with elsewhere; see Eriksen (1991a). Cultural aspects of ethnic differences in the two societies are discussed in Eriksen (1991b).
8. *Picong* is a form of word-play where the participants produce witty insults. The now extinct calypso form known as *sans humanité* was a highly sophisticated type of picong.
9. His most famous book is probably *Capitalism and Slavery* (Williams 1944). He is also the author of a highly acclaimed history of the Caribbean (Williams 1970).
10. While he remains in many ways an important symbol of self-determination and independence, Williams, who died in 1981, has lately been repeatedly accused of having upset the ethnic equilibrium (in 1972 one of the thirteen Cabinet ministers was an Indian – a Muslim), and making the country bankrupt through creating an overdependence on its oil exports.
11. A university economist, Morgan Job, caused a great stir when he stated during a debate on television in June 1989 that *Capitalism and Slavery* was 'a very wicked book'. In Job's opinion, Williams has created an ambience of *ressentiment* tempting Trinidadians to blame colonialism for all their failures and making them reluctant to trust their own potential.

12. Eric Williams was a master at exploiting both ends of the continuum. In the late fifties, his great slogan for independence was *Massa Day Done*, where he drew on anti-British resentment and simultaneously gave cause for national pride. Twenty years later, well established as a respectable 'boss', Williams ordered his electorate to *go back to work* ('Go back to work, the party's over!') as oil prices fell.
13. Limbo dancing, which was allegedly invented in Trinidad, is still featured in tourist brochures but hardly anywhere else. Occasionally, however, the Hilton Hotel puts on limbo shows for its guests.
14. An attempt to explain the origins of this situation falls outside the scope of this article; allow me to mention, nevertheless, that the interaction between class-specific symbolic universes is very different in, for example, Barbados and Jamaica, and that the lack of bounded symbolic universes in Trinidad is to a great extent caused by the peculiarly fluid, flexible class structure that has been present in the island for two hundred years.
15. The *séga* is an indigenous musical form reminiscent of the Trinidad calypso.
16. See Keens-Douglas (1985) for a similar reflection in the context of Trinidadian national identity: 'If yuh move your waist from lef to right dat is art but if yuh move it backwards a forwards dat is vulgar'.
17. *Ledikasyon pu travayer* (Education for Workers); the most important organization favouring the universal use of Kreol.
18. At this point in the analysis of nationalism I disagree with Kapferer (1988, p. 207), who links nationalism intrinsically with the state: '[T]he power of nationalism to evoke ethnic sentiment and a spirit of racism is contained in the egalitarian roots of much modern society, in the very egalitarian constitution of the modern nation-state itself'. The nationalist ideology that I have described here does not depend directly on the agency of the state for its existence, although it may be true that it depends on the 'egalitarian roots of . . . modern society'.
19. She was immensely popular, particularly in the years following her death, in both Mauritius and Trinidad. A famous calypso from the period, Chieftain Douglas's 'Mourn, Trinidadians, Mourn', actually indicated that the Queen had been responsible for the abolition of slavery.

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